[SAIBAMAIS]Data: 25/01/2008
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SUBJECT: BRAZILIAN DEFENSE MINISTER ON DCA, TRIP TO FRANCE AND RUSSIA, CIVIL AVIATION
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL
;1. (C) Summary. Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim told the Ambassador January 17 that he would like to sign a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA, ref A) when he visits Washington in March, but that he faces stiff opposition in the Ministry of External Relations (MRE or Itamaraty). He briefed the Ambassador on his upcoming trip to France and Russia, and on his continuing work regarding civil aviation matters. The internal GOB discussion on the merits of a DCA will likely center on the message the GOB thinks it will send regarding the nature of Brazil;s relationship with the United States. End summary.
Defense Cooperation Agreement: The Battle is Joined
;2. (C) In a private breakfast on January 17, the Ambassador told Jobim that his initial approach on a DCA to MRE Under Secretary for Political Affairs Everton Vargas had not been SIPDIS well received, and that Vargas had specifically mentioned Secretary General (Vice Minister) Samuel Guimaraes when SIPDIS asking for time to work the issue internally (ref B). Jobim responded that Guimaraes posed a serious problem, not only on the DCA but on a variety of issues. Jobim said that Guimaraes "hates the United States" and is actively looking to create problems in the relationship. Jobim said that he has had to beat back more than one outlandish proposal by Guimaraes calculated to upset relations with the U.S. and other industrialized countries.
;3. (C) Jobim said that he would like to sign the DCA when he travels to Washington in March. Guimaraes has told him that cannot happen and is working hard to prevent the DCA from being concluded. He argued that, as Jobim;s predecessor went to the United States in 2007, protocol demands a return visit by the U.S. Defense Secretary. (Comment: Strictly speaking, this is not true, as the meeting between the SecDef and Jobim;s predecessor was not part of an official counterpart visit. End comment.) He told Jobim that his trip would "mean nothing" compared with the symbolism of a visit by the SecDef to Brazil. Jobim said he pushed back, telling Guimaraes that "Itamaraty is the process," not the substance of engagement on his issues. But he told the Ambassador that he does not want to "win the battle and lose the war" and expend too much political capital on the DCA, so will have to proceed carefully. In particular, he said, if Guimaraes and FM Amorim join forces against a DCA, that could be a serious problem.
Submarines in France, Helos in Russia
;4. (C) Jobim told the Ambassador that the primary purpose of his upcoming trip to France is to discuss design issues for a nuclear-powered submarine. He also said that he will look at France;s Rafale airplane. In Russia Jobim;s primary purpose is to ensure servicing for Brazil;s Russian helicopters. He noted that Russia wants to open a jeep facility in Porto Alegre, and that he will travel to Russia in an Embraer plane in the hope of making sales there.
Civil Aviation: Engaged on Latest Problems
;5. (SBU) Jobim told the Ambassador that he believes he has found options for avoiding the proposed draconian increase in landing fees at Sao Paulo;s Guarulhos airport (ref C), especially as they can have another apron ready quickly. He asked for another few weeks to work the issue. Discussing Brazil;s airport operator Infraero, he said that the current management problems are so big that more time will be needed before he can consider opening it up to foreign investors.
;6. (C) Comment: Jobim;s candid comments on Guimaraes confirm similar messages from U/S Vargas and Long-Term Planning BRASILIA 00000129 002 OF 002 Minister Roberto Unger (ref B) regarding the difficult internal battle in the GOB that will surround the proposal for a DCA with the United States. As he has since the beginning of his tenure, Jobim continues to challenge the historic supremacy of Itamaraty in all areas of foreign policy. President Lula;s direction to Jobim to postpone his visit to Washington (initially planned for January) until he had met with his Latin American counterparts was almost certainly provided on the basis of input from Itamaraty and presidential foreign policy advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia. In the same way, the merits of a DCA are likely to be considered by the GOB at least in part in light of the message it will convey regarding the nature of Brazil;s relationship with the United States. Once again, President Lula may have to play the deciding role between an unusually activist Defense Minister interested in developing closer ties with the United States and an MRE that is firmly committed to maintaining control over all aspects of foreign policy and to keeping a measure of distance between Brazil and the United States.
SOBEL
Data: 20/02/2008
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR;S MEETING WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE JOBIM
;1. (C) Ambassador Sobel met with Brazilian Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim Feb. 13 to discuss Jobim;s upcoming visit to Washington, regional security and progress on defense cooperation. Jobim agreed with Ambassador Sobel;s outline of possible areas for discussion during his March visit to Washington, including further discussion of a defense cooperation agreement. He also signaled that Brazil would be open to discussions regarding negotiation of a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), similar to that concluded with France. Chief of Ministry Staff Murilo Marques Barboza said that a GSOMIA had been discussed in the past, but had broken down over arrangements for "inspections" of Brazilian facilities. This probably reflects Brazilian sensitivities over allowing U.S. access to military facilities, even with reciprocal access to those in the U.S. Jobim and Barboza indicated openness to renewing a dialogue on a GSOMIA, but in order to complete such an agreement, the "inspections" will need a clearer characterization as reciprocal visits. Jobim also expressed interest in technology transfers, particularly as they could apply to Brazilian plans to modernize its military. Ambassador Sobel acknowledged that we were aware of Brazilian interest in U.S. submarine technology and were preparing what we hoped would be a constructive response.
;2. (C) In a separate meeting with MOD Chief of Staff Barboza, DATT was told that the MOD;s response to the U.S. was aimed at reaching consensus with the USG that could gain President Lula;s support as a deliverable for Jobim;s visit to Washington, circumventing MRE obstruction. This was the tactic that led to completion of the SOFA with France earlier this year. Barboza indicated that the French SOFA used language that did not provoke constitutional onjections as previous proposals for U.S.-Brazil SOFAs have. He counselled observing the reaction of Brazil;s Congress to the French SOFA (and completing the DCA) before working on a U.S.-Brazil version. Barboza also expressed caution on the possible GSOMIA, noting that no other information sharing arrangment to which Brazil is a party would involve visits. He did, however, leave the door open to exploration of a formula that could work for both sides.
;3. (C) Jobim told Ambassador Sobel that the Brazilian government shared the Ambassador;s concern about the possibility of Venezuela exporting instability. He believed that President Chavez has been saber rattling to distract from internal problems. Brazil supports creation of a "South American Defense Council" to bring Chavez into the mainstream of the continent and provide reassurance that there is no security threat. Jobim believed that isolating Venezuela would lead to further posturing from Chavez and a greater risk of spreading instability among neighboring countries. 4. (C) EMBASSY COMMENT: However impractical the suggestion may seem, it follows the traditional Brazilian policy of trying to be everyone;s friend by attempting to incorporate Chavez; idea for defense cooperation into a supposed containment strategy. SOBEL
Data: 13/03/2008
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF MINISTER OF DEFENSE NELSON JOBIM TO WASHINGTON BRASILIA
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel
;1. (C) Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim will travel to Norfolk and Washington from March 18-22, 2008 on a counterpart visit. He will meet with Secretary Gates in an office call on March 20 June. Minister Jobim,s objectives for the visit are to enhance prospects for bilateral cooperation and explore possibilities for access to U.S. defense technology.
;2. (C) Summary: Minister Jobim is the first strong Minister of Defense in Brazil. He is working to centralize civilian oversight of the Brazilian military and hopes to learn from the U.S. military in this regard. He has also clearly indicated a desire to pursue military cooperation agreements despite objections from the Ministry for External Affairs, such as in the case of concluding a SOFA with France. He has also expressed his desire to pursue a Defense Cooperation Agreement with the U.S. and to have it approved directly by the President. Jobim has also been helpful in making progress on a General Security of Information Agreement, which requires approval by Brazil,s Ministry of Interior and Office for Institutional Security. Although the U.S. and Brazil share the basic goals of fostering hemispheric stability, preventing terrorist activity and strengthening international non-proliferation regimes, U.S.-Brazil cooperation is hindered by difficulties in completing a bilateral defense cooperation agreement, providing protections for U.S. personnel involved in training and joint exercises and taking proactive steps to address countries of proliferation concern such as Iran. Brazil has maintained its leadership role in the Haiti peacekeeping force MINUSTAH under the active advocacy of the Foreign Ministry. Jobim,s visit comes at an important time as Brazil is formulating a new National Defense Strategy and beginning to make decisions about acquisition of new military systems and technology. Other military issues of interest include service relations with the fledgling civilian defense ministry and the necessity of negotiating further agreements with the U.S. in order to enhance our already strong military-to-military relationship. End Summary.
Politico-Economic Overview
;3. (SBU) President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was elected in 2002 in large part on promises of promoting an ambitious social agenda, including generous handouts to the poor. On the strength of the popularity of these measures, he was re-elected in 2006, although with diminished support from the middle class. The public;s top concerns - crime and public security - have not improved under this administration. The Lula Administration has been beset by a grave political crisis as interlocking influence peddling/vote-buying scandals plagued elements of Lula;s PT party, but the President,s personal popularity has not suffered, even after many of his closest associates have been caught in corrupt practices. MOD Jobim is perhaps among the most trusted leaders in Brazil. A former Supreme Court Justice, he maintains a strong reputation for integrity that is rare among Brazil,s leadership.
Friendly Cooperation, But Not Strong Friendship
;4. (C) Brazil;s democratic institutions are strong and stable after more than 20 years of civilian rule. A return to military dictatorship is today unthinkable as Brazil;s armed forces pursue a professional non-political identity. With steady export-led economic growth having become the norm in the recent past, Brazil has been a supporter of reasoned foreign policy goals and has been steadfast in its support of democracy in the hemisphere. It has a strong interest in hemispheric security issues that largely mirrors our own, and actively cooperates with us on the operational level in the fight against terrorism. BRASILIA 00000351 002.2 OF 003
;5. (C) While relations between the U.S. and Brazil are generally friendly, often the USG encounters major difficulties in gaining the cooperation of senior policymakers on issues of significant interest to the United States. The difficulty is most apparent in the Ministry for External Affairs (MRE) which maintains an anti-American slant and has tried to block improved DoD-MOD relations. In planning for Jobim,s visit, the MRE actively campaigned to limit Jobim,s time in Washington to one largely ceremonial day with little substance.
;6. (C) The current left-of-center administration has studiously avoided close cooperation on pol-mil issues important to us and has kept us at arms length on most security-related issues. Specifically, the MRE has dragged its feet on completing a Defense Cooperation Agreement, General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) or Article 98 agreement. The GOB traditionally maintained that such agreements, particularly the SOFA, were against Brazilian law, but reversed itself (over MRE objections) and signed a SOFA with France earlier this year. We are exploring the possibility of using the French SOFA as a starting place for a U.S.-Brazil agreement.
;7. (C) Brazil has stayed the course as leader of MINUSTAH in Haiti despite a lack of domestic support for the PKO. The MRE has remained committed to the initiative because it believes that the operation serves FM Amorim;s obsessive international goal of qualifying Brazil for a seat on the UN Security Council. The Brazilian military remains committed as well, because the mission enhances its international prestige and provides training and operational opportunities. So far, President Lula has backed the Foreign Ministry;s position, and Brazil will likely continue to provide leadership and troops to MINUSTAH for the conceivable future. Despite the success of the MINUSTAH deployment, Brazil has not shown any interest in undertaking further peacekeeping operations, although Brazilian contributions to UN operations in such places as Darfur have been requested.
CT and Non-Proliferation
;8. (C) The desire not to be identified with the U.S. is borne out as well in the GOB;s approach to counterterrorism. Cooperation remains excellent at the operational level, especially between law enforcement agencies. However, the GOB political leadership has refused to endorse U.S. counterterrorism initiatives publicly and has insisted that official communiques of the 3 1 mechanism note that there is no evidence of terrorist operations in the Tri-Border area, where Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina meet. Wary of its large, prosperous and influential Arab population, the GOB makes every effort to downplay in public even the possibility of terrorist fund-raising going on inside Brazil.
;9. (C) The GOB has a good record in non-proliferation efforts, but has been slow to join international consensus in favor of sanctions on Iran. Brazil has also not yet signed the NPT Additional Protocol, although it has not ruled out signing it in the near future.
Military Issues
;10. (C) Brazil established a Ministry of Defense (MoD) for the first time in June 1999, uniting the three services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) under a single minister. Jobim became Minister last year when the disastrous crash of a Brazilian airliner highlighted weaknesses in the civil aviation system, which comes under MOD purview. Organizationally, the MOD still faces challenges managing the individual services. Each service is still fairly autonomous and controls its own budget and acquisition programs. In addition, the Lula administration,s focus on social reforms BRASILIA 00000351 003.2 OF 003 and programs has meant decreases for military budgets, leading to fewer training opportunities and equipment purchases. This situation is changing as there is now near consensus among Brazil,s leadership that the military is under-resourced and under equipped to accomplish its missions.
;11. (C) To address this situation, the Lula government has tasked a new National Defense strategy to be completed by this fall. This paper will set the framework for military modernization and theoretically drive decisions on acquisition of new equipment. In reality, such decisions will be made largely for political and economic reasons. Brazil,s defense industrial base has atrophied since the end of the Cold War, and it is a major objective of the government to reinvigorate it. Decisions on major systems will be influenced much more by access to foreign technology and opportunities for Brazilian industry than by the capabilities such systems will add to Brazil,s military.
General Points to Make
;18. (SBU) Our core message for Jobim;s visit should be: -- Reinforcing and underscoring the importance of these agreements in support of Brazil,s interest to reequip and modernize its military with technology transfer is critically important. It would also help to define how we, the anchor of the North America, and Brazil the anchor of South America, may be able to work more closely in the future to enhance hemispheric defense cooperation. We recommend SecDef also emphasize the following points in conversations with Minister Jobim: -- We want to continue improving our defense relationship. This is an imperative, given the difficult global security situation in which we live today, and the importance of Brazil,s role in the Americas. -- We are serious about our partnership in Brazil. We see strong possibilities for joint research and production, exchanges of military personnel and training. -- As you make important decisions about the modernization of Brazil,s forces later this year, keep in mind that partnership with the U.S. can help both our countries realize our common goal of preserving stability in the Western Hemisphere. -- As we continue to develop our partnership, we need to have in place several standard documents to assure smooth cooperation. The Defense Cooperation Agreement is the first of these. We understand your Ministry has approved the current draft and hope the rest of your government will also. Next, we hope to complete an agreement on information security and a Status of Forces Agreement to protect the forces of both countries during joint exercises. -- The United States would like to congratulate Brazil for its efforts in Haiti. The improving situation there is in no small measure due to the professionalism and dedication of Brazilian troops and leadership. We hope Brazil is resolved to continue to contribute to the success of MINUSTAH. SOBEL
Data: 31/03/2008
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SUBJECT: THOUGHTS ON THE VISIT OF DEFENSE MINISTER JOBIM TO WASHINGTON
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel.
;1. (C) SUMMARY: Defense Minister Jobim;s March 18-21 visit to Washington focused on Brazil;s efforts to modernize its defense institutions and on possible avenues for bilateral cooperation and identified several areas for further work, particularly completion of a General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA) and a possible Defense Technology Security Dialogue. Jobim also used the visit to make the point that Brazil seeks defense modernization that will benefit its domestic industries, while keeping open the possibility of purchasing U.S. fighter aircraft. Brazilian coverage of the visit, however, has largely ignored the real possibilities for cooperation and focused on Jobim;s advocacy of a South American Defense Council (SADC). In meetings with Secretaries Rice and Gates and National Security Advisor SIPDIS Hadley, Jobim remained cautious on enhancing bilateral defense cooperation, reflecting the more negative approach of the Ministry for External Relations (MRE) which had sought to curtail Jobim;s trip and to inhibit the U.S.-Brazil dialogue on defense issues. While there are good prospects to improve our defense relationship with Brazil, MRE obstruction will continue to be a problem. Our best avenues for progress will be through completing the GSOIA (to which the MRE does not object), to look for opportunities to underline that Brazil will have the same access to U.S. military technology as other friendly nations and to try to get high level support within the Brazilian government for the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), which would allow the Defense Ministry to pursue cooperation with the U.S. military without the current MRE veto. END SUMMARY.
;2. (C) As reported in ref b, Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim;s visit to Washington focused on Brazil;s efforts to modernize its defense institutions and on possibilities for bilateral cooperation. Coming out of Jobim;s meetings, Mission has identified several priorities for the bilateral defense relationship, including the DCA, GSOIA, the Defense Techology Security Dialogue, a possible visit by Air Force Science Officers and closer engagement on Joint matters. Jobim did not, however, express optimism about the DCA, even though the MOD has cleared on the current draft of the text. The current DCA draft is with the MRE, which seems in no hurry to act on it. Separately, MRE political military advisor Marcos Pinta Gama expressed the view that the DCA would require high level intervention and should be a deliverable for a future Ministerial level meeting. On defense modernization, Jobim;s message was clear: Brazil;s priority will be to benefit its domestic defense industries. Purchases from U.S. suppliers will be most competitive when they enable Brazilian production of future military systems. Jobim understands the need for improving Brazil;s military capabilities, but will seek to do so in the context of independent domestic production.
;3. (C) The Air Force presentation on the F35 impressed the Brazilian delegation, both with the aircraft;s capabilities and the cooperative approach being used for its production. Jobim did, however, express reservations about the plane;s cost and the degree to which Brazilian industries would benefit. This will be the determining factor for Brazil. If there would be a possibility for integration of Brazilian made hardware or weapons, the F35 would be a leading candidate for Brazil;s next generation fighter. Pinta Gama underlined that Brazil will not be making a decision immediately, but in the context of requirements derived from the Defense Modernization Plan, to be completed in September. At the same time, he expressed a lack of confidence in Minister for Planning Unger;s leadership of defense planning, indicating that Jobim would do better.
;4. (C) Brazilian coverage of the visit has focused on Jobim;s advocacy for the proposed SADC based on the assumption that the U.S. would oppose such an organization. BRASILIA 00000429 002 OF 002 Folha of Sao Paulo commented that the SADC did not make sense as its purpose seemed to be to exclude the U.S. Working level Brazilian staffers accompanying Jobim expressed surprise that the U.S. reaction to the SADC proposal was positive because of a divergence of views on what the SADC could do. While the U.S. views a SADC as a means to improve South American military cooperation and facilitate peacekeeping, on the model of the African Union, the Brazilians see its value more in terms of reinforcing Brazilian leadership, moderating Venezuela President Chavez and facilitating common military production (primarily in Brazil).
;5. (C) While the Jobim visit served to clarify the prospects for future U.S.-Brazil military cooperation, Jobim remained reserved on the subject. While he told SecDef Gates that he wanted to strength the defense relationship, he also stuck to rather shopworn talking points on why the U.S. made this difficult. He dusted off the complaint that U.S. refusal to allow U.S. origin components in the Super Tucano aircraft to be sold to Venezuela led to Chavez purchase of much higher tech Russian fighters. In his public remarks at CSIS, Jobim avoided the subject of defense cooperation and stuck to recent history and the SADC proposal. It is likely that on his own Jobim would have been more forward leaning on defense cooperation but was somewhat constrained by the MRE (which sent a "handler" along for the trip). As Jobim told Ambassador Sobel in February (ref a), he had pushed the Brazil-France SOFA through over MRE objections. As a result, the MRE is now keeping a closer watch on Jobim as seen by the Brazilian Embassy;s foot dragging over scheduling Jobim;s visit. While Jobim was telling Ambassador Sobel that he wanted a full schedule, including the visit to Norfolk and meetings with representatives of U.S. defense industries, the Brazilian Embassy in Washington was telling us that the visit would be curtailed. Jobim;s chief of staff, Murilo Barboza told embassy officers that the Brazilian Embassy had made several attempts to change the Minister;s schedule in favor of a shorter, less substantive visit.
;6. (C) EMBASSY COMMENT: Given the resistance from the MRE to the development of the bilateral defense relationship, the most effective way forward will be to pick the low hanging fruit, i.e. to push forward with areas of cooperation which the MRE will support. Specifically, a GSOIA and the beginning of a Defense Technology Security Dialogue should be first steps. The Brazilians are interested in the Security Dialogue as a means to improve their effectiveness in gaining access to U.S. technology through better compliance with U.S. export control regulations. While pursuing these items, we should also continue to urge completion of the DCA, looking for high-level opportunities to make the case. The main advantage of the DCA will be to allow the MOD and DoD to work together on supplementary protocols that could enhance the already good cooperation at the forces level without having to rely on case by case approvals from the MRE. END COMMENT. SOBEL
Data: 22/01/2009
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SUBJECT: BRAZIL;S LULA OFFERS BOLIVIA;S MORALES TREATMENT FOR TUMOR
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel
;1. (C) In a conversation with Ambassador Sobel following the January 15, 2009 La Paz meeting between Brazilian President Lula and Bolivian President Morales, Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim (protect) confirmed an earlier rumor that Morales is suffering from a serious sinus tumor. Jobim told the Ambassador that Lula had offered Morales an examination and treatment at a Sao Paulo hospital. Although there have been been public reports that Morales needs surgery for "acute sinusitis," and related otitis and headaches, according to Jobim his problems in fact are caused by a serious tumor and the surgery will be an effort to remove it. Treatment has been put off, however, until after the constitutional referendum scheduled for January 25. Jobim, who attended the meeting between Lula and Morales, commented that the tumor might explain why Morales has seemed unfocussed and not his usual self at this and other recent meetings. SOBEL
Data: 13/11/2009
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SUBJECT: CHARGE DISCUSSES SECURITY COOPERATION, FIGHTER SALE AND COLOMBIA WITH MOD JOBIM
;1. (C) SUMMARY. In a November 9 meeting, Charge Kubiske and Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim discussed next steps in the United States-Brazil bilateral security relationship, the potential sale of U.S.-origin fighter aircraft and regional security. Jobim showed strong interest in furthering security cooperation by signing the Defense Cooperation as soon as possible and completing an information security agreement. Jobim told Charge that there would not be any decision on fighters until sometime after his return from international travel on November 23 and said that capability, technology transfer, benefit to Brazil;s industrial capacity and price would be the criteria for decision. He offered no signs of encouragement that the U.S. bid would be chosen.
;2. (C) Speaking of regional security issues, Jobim all but acknowledged presence of the FARC in Venezuela, offered a suggestion for building Colombia-Ecuador confidence along their border, and a possible border-monitoring arrangement for combating the drug flow between Colombia and Brazil. Jobim indicated concern about the contents of an USAF budget document which linked U.S. military access to bases in Colombia with "unfriendly governments" as evidence of a lack of understanding of Latin America. He believed that recent inflammatory statements from Presidents Uribe and Chavez are aimed at domestic constituencies on the eve of upcoming elections, and called a potential Uribe run for a third term a terrible precedent for Bolivarian governments in the region. Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia;s public offer, only two days later, to monitor border activities as a way to reduce tensions between Colombia and Venezuela shows Jobim;s influence. Despite the GOB;s tendency to blame Colombia for current tensions, its efforts to maintain peace are sincere and should be encouraged. END SUMMARY.
Structuring the U.S.-Brazil Security Relationship
;3. (C) Brazilian Defense Minister Jobim expressed support for moving forward with U.S.-Brazil security cooperation, first by signing the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), then moving on to other arrangements, including a information security agreement (GSOMIA). Jobim said he would see SecDef Gates at the International Security Forum, November 20 in Halifax and could sign the DCA there, if it were ready. If not, Jobim would like to sign before the December 10-11 Bilateral Working Group. Jobim also favored moving forward with an information security agreement, saying he would be discussing the issue with the Ministry for External Relations (MRE). (Note: Polmiloff discussed the information sharing agreement with MRE pol-mil advisor Marcos Pinta Gama last week. Pinta Gama was interested in moving forward as well and planned to consult with the MOD. End note.)
FX-2 Fighter Competition
;4. (C) Asked about the Fx-2 competition, Minister Jobim repeated previous statements that the FX2 fighter competition would be based on capability, technology transfer, benefit to Brazil;s industrial capacity and price. Technology transfer will be evaluated in terms of how it will contribute to Brazil;s future industrial capacity. The Charge reiterated and deepened advocacy points in each of these areas, calling a decision to select the U.S. bid an accelerator for an already growing U.S.-Brazil military and commercial relationship. Jobim informed the Charge that he and President Lula will review the Brazilian Air Force,s technical analysis of the three competing bids after he returns from international travel November 23. Jobim will then make a recommendation to President Lula. Lula, in turn, will make a decision and inform the National Defense Council, for its concurrence. BRASILIA 00001315 002 OF 002
The U.S.-Colombia DCA and Regional Implications
;5. (C) Jobim said he was aware of the purpose of the Agreement giving the United States access to Colombian bases, but the availability of an Air Force budget memo over the internet, which cited "unfriendly countries" in the area had complicated matters. He said the document showed "a complete lack of understanding" of Latin America and said he had had to discuss the issue with the President to urge "moderation" from Lula.
;6. (C) Jobim then went into a lengthy discussion of security in the Andean region, including Colombia-Brazil, Colombia-Venezuela and Colombia-Ecuador dimensions with Colombia at the center of the region;s potential instability. He noted that both Presidents Uribe and Chavez have been making statements aimed at domestic constituencies that have contributed to tensions between them. Jobim also was critical of Uribe seeking a third term, a move which he thought set a bad precedent for the "Bolivarists." Jobim stressed Brazil;s "moderate approach" and willingness to build confidence, in particular by providing aerial surveillance of border regions and by sponsoring exchanges of information on military movements in border areas. Asked about the presence of the FARC in Venezuela, Jobim said that, were he to acknowledge its presence there "it would ruin Brazil,s ability to mediate."
;7. (C) COMMENT. Minister Jobim was eager to discuss security agreements and animated about the regional issues, but was clearly not comfortable talking about the FX-2 competition. While he has been prominent in the press in recent days saying that "past problems" with USG "tech transfer" (in reality export licensing) cases undermined confidence in USG assurances about the Super Hornet sale, he did not raise this concern with Charge and avoided the opportunity to discuss any lingering concerns he might have. In discussing the eventual FX-2 decision, he tried to downplay the importance of price but instead highlighted contributions to Brazilian industrial capacity. Given that the Boeing offer would integrate Brazilian companies with Boeing,s global business and thus offers excellent potential for long-term economic gain, this should be good news, and we pointed that out. However, President Lula may choose a different means of evaluation. Brazil;s 2008 Defense Strategy requires that purchase of foreign made aircraft be made only if such purchase will lead to indigenous production of more advanced aircraft. Should the political goal that Brazil should someday export fighters to its neighbors -- even if market conditions make this possibility remote -- trump Brazilian Air Force analysis of the aircraft and real economic possibilities, Lula and Jobim will most likely favor the French or Swedish offers, both of which highlight the possibility of export production.
;8. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED. Within two days of the Charge;s discussion with Jobim, Presidential Advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia went public with Brazil;s willingness to help ease Colombia-Venezuela tensions through border monitoring, including aerial surveillance. This announcement shows Jobim;s closeness to Lula on security issues and once again highlights Brazil;s desire to be the continent;s peacemaker. Although the GOB,s continued questioning of the intent of the U.S.-Colombia DCA and insistence on painting Uribe as the primary source of Andean tensions may limit the GOB,s effectiveness, we believe the GOB genuinely seeks to reduce tensions, and we should encourage these efforts. KUBISKE